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Neuroscience was the basic science behind Freud’s psychoanalytic theory and
technique. He worked as a neurologist for 20 years before being aware that a
new approach to understand complex diseases, namely the hysterias, was needed.
Solms coined the term neuropsychoanalysis to affirm that neuroscience still belongs in
psychoanalysis. The neuropsychoanalytic field has continued Freud’s original ideas as
stated in 1895. Developments in psychoanalysis that have been created or revised by
the neuropsychoanalysis movement include pain/relatedness/opioids, drive, structural
model, dreams, cathexis, and dynamic unconscious. Neuroscience has contributed to
the development of new psychoanalytic theory, such as Bazan’s (2011) description of
anxiety driven by unconscious intentions or “phantoms.” Results of adopting the “dual
aspect monism” approach of idiographic psychoanalytic clinical observation combined
with nomothetic investigation of related human phenomena include clarification and
revision of theory, restoration of the scientific base of psychoanalysis, and improvement
of clinical treatments. By imbricating psychoanalytic thinking with neuroscience,
psychoanalysts are also positioned to make contributions to neuroscience research.
Freud’s original Project for a Scientific Psychology/Psychology for Neurologists can be
carried forward in a way that moves psychoanalysis into the twenty-first century as
a core contemporary science (Kandel, 1999). Neuroscience as the basic science of
psychoanalysis both improves the field, and enhances its scientific and cultural status.
Keywords: neuropsychoanalysis, neuroscience, drive, cathexis, phantoms, dynamic unconscious, pain
Psychoanalysis had its origins within neuroscience. Freudworked as a neurologist and neuroscience
researcher for 20 years (Sacks, 1998) before turning his interest to a pure psychological theory,
trying to explain common and previously incomprehensible disorders such as hysteria. Freud and
Breuer (1893-1895) proposed using neuroscience to understand this disorder. Breuer considered
the topic of energy in the nervous system while Freud described an unconscious mind. Both started
to appreciate that the splitting of the psyche was not only present in hysterical patients, but in
every human being. Freud wrote his last attempt to understand the mind from a neurobiological
perspective in the 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology/Psychology for Neurologists. Although
he abandoned neuroscience in his theory, Freud thought at the end of his life (Freud, 1938) that
neuroscience was still needed to support his provisional proposals of psychoanalysis.
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100 years later a group of psychoanalysts and neuroscientists
from all over the world renewed Freud’s original approach
using contemporary neuroscience resources. Solms and Turnbull
(2011) have proposed a dialogue between the neurosciences and
psychoanalysis that can make relevant contributions to both
fields. While the field has become crowded with important
research, we will summarize some of the achievements arranged
thematically, and suggest that enough evidence has accreted
to acknowledge that the relationship of neuroscience to
psychoanalysis has become similar to the relationship of basic
sciences to medicine. In fact, it was so from the beginning.
New tools available in neuroscience are responsible for bringing
awareness that the mind is the subject of study of many fields and
perspectives and not only of psychoanalysis. Neuroscientists are
building hypotheses to the study of the subjective aspects of the
nervous system as simultaneously psychoanalytic clinicians are
benefiting from taking the brain into account. The human being
is a feeling organism that requires an integrated comprehension
of both the subjective and objective. Neuroscience informs and
constrains the continued building of the psychoanalytic model
of the mind and its clinical applications. In the following
sections, we will summarize some examples that illustrate
how the inclusion of neuroscience back into psychoanalytic
understanding can be of benefit for a deeper understanding of
psychic determinism—a cornerstone of Freud’s thinking.
PAIN, RELATEDNESS, AND ENDOGENOUS
OPIOIDS
Pain is the most common chief complaint of medical patients
(Fields and Martin, 2005). Pain Medicine has become such a
complex field that it has its own fellowship program in the
United States, is discussed in many pain specialty journals, and
is known by physicians as a difficult symptom to address. This
most common presenting complaint can become much more
intelligible for both psychoanalysts and general physicians if a
neuropsychoanalytic approach is used. Pain is inextricably related
to the nervous system, but this subjective state that can be
approached psychoanalytically.
The classical psychoanalytic approach to pain was described
with beautiful insight by Thomas Szasz in the mid-twentieth
century (Szasz, 1957/1975). He used the term “sensation” to
describe something that is experienced equally by all, such
as the glare of the sun, and “perception” as something that
requires attention to bring it to full awareness, such as a
“mindfulness” approach. In contrast, pain is an affect. Somatic
signals are contextualized by each person’s developmental history
and interpersonal environment (p. 239), resulting in a partially
conscious experience that a psychoanalyst can tune in to
empathically. The role of the psychoanalyst is to help the patient
understand their experience with more consciousness so that
choices of response to pain multiply, often resulting in a more
effective response to pain signals by the patient.
If a psychoanalytic approach to the pain of a patient does not
take its neural substrate into account, pain can be misunderstood
as a uniform experience and that all symptoms are interpretable
only from the subjective point of view. Indeed defenses are
arrayed unconsciously and intentionally, making the patient
less anxious but also less aware of the determinants of her
or his behavior. Every one of us has experienced pain. The
psychoanalyst puts herself or himself in the place of the patient
to help inform interpretations of unconscious determinants of
behavior. In the common case of chronic back pain, patients
have usually tried an array of remedies including surgeries,
but the pain never stops. Consequently, many of them take
opioid medication, becoming vulnerable to an addiction that
involves a pathway related to subjective pain, namely the PANIC
system in Panksepp’s (1998) taxonomy of emotions. PANIC
is activated by separation distress. The chronic back patient
then comes to a psychoanalytic session to talk about a possible
psychosomatic association related to their pain, but sometimes
both patient and analyst are not aware of the neurochemical
implications of the medication that the patient is taking. The
patient will not feel in need of much human contact when
taking an opioid medication, and probably will not talk much
about separation anxiety, even if isolated. The transference will
be modified by a physical symptom and a common medication.
Understanding the interactions of pain, the PANIC system, and
opioid medication in these cases is an essential clinical need.
The modification of the transference by opioids, and the onset
of PANIC/annihilation anxiety with the cessation of opioid
use, was discussed in a psychoanalytic case report by Johnson
(2010).
Another important factor can be seen in the description
of fMRI results contrasting empathy with a loved one vs. a
stranger. “Adopting the perspective of a loved-one increased
activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and insula, whereas
imagining a stranger induced a signal increase in the right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and superior frontal gyrus. The
closer the participants’ relationships were with their partner,
the greater the deactivation in the right TPJ. A negative
effective connectivity between the right TPJ and the insula,
and a positive one with the superior frontal gyrus were found
when participants imagined the perspective of a stranger”
(Cheng et al., 2010; author Decety presented his work at the
Athens Neuropsychoanalysis Congress in 2012). This is a fact
that no psychoanalyst might get to introspectively, and some
might wonder if it is useful to know at all. Apart from it
showing correlates between the quality of relationships and
neuroanatomical structures, which is another piece of evidence
of how the mind and brain depend upon each other and
are influenced by experience, it also alerts the psychoanalyst
that the state of the countertransference may influence the
accuracy of empathy. How close one feels to one’s patient
influences the brain of the psychoanalyst. The fact that a patient
is taking opioid pills might affect role-responsive (Sandler,
1976) countertransference. This information may contribute to
the understanding of different moments of the analyst-patient
relationship that would require further investigation. Both from
the clinical observation of the analyst and from neuroscientific
data, this set of complementary sources of information may
lead to new hypotheses on how the analytic relationship evolves
during the treatment.
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Pain experience may not be uniform. The discovery that
multiple alleles of the SCN9A gene results in no pain, normal
pain, or increased pain sensitivity (Peddareddygari et al.,
2014) need to be taken into account. Due to variable genetic
endowment, the analyst and the patient may have different pain
systems. Neuroscience informs psychoanalysts about a potential
constitutional difference. The genetic variant might be tested for
if the psychoanalyst wondered about unusual pain complaints.
This information is useful to consider—that knowing
someone else’s experience seems to be truly impossible.
However, it does not require subtracting one’s empathy from a
psychoanalytic encounter, or doubting its validity in all cases.
That would remove a key tool from an impossible profession.
The neuropsychoanalytic approach would be to use the biological
information to inform clinical work, and also to imagine the
possibility that the psychoanalyst’s insight about developmental
history and interpersonal environment might be relevant to
nomothetic research. For example, the high-pain variant of
the SCN9A gene was found to be present in 12% of normal
controls and 40% of patients with interstitial cystitis—not 100%
of interstitial cystitis patients (Reeder et al., 2013).
In summary, pain is an affect that has contributions
from constitutional factors such as SCN9A gene variant,
developmental history, and interpersonal environment. Empathy
for the pain of a psychoanalytic patient, or the patient
complaining about their bladder in a general practitioner’s office,
may have to do with the degree of closeness in the relationship.
Genetic vulnerability is only one factor involved in a focus on the
bladder. The principle of multiple function (Waelder, 2007/1936)
is likely operating in a way that treaters, psychoanalytic or not,
would find useful.
Panksepp has shown that the pain system, an endowment of
all animals to protect against tissue damage, has been adapted
by social animals such as humans to modulate relatedness
(Nelson and Panksepp, 1998). Being close feels good. Loss
through death or separation hurts (Panksepp and Biven, 2012,
p. 459). Johnson et al. (2014) elaborated some psychoanalytic
consequences of Panksepp’s hypotheses (Panksepp and Biven,
2012, pp. 325–328) that opioidergic activity underlies human
relatedness, and that autism is a consequence of opioidergic
hyperactivity (Figure 1). Johnson suggested that healthy persons
use interpersonal relatedness to shift opioidergic tone in a narrow
range indicated schematically by the bar at the top of the inverse
U. Too much contact begins to make people uncomfortable as
augmented tone becomes dysphoric. They spend time alone.
Loneliness begins to make people uncomfortable as diminished
tone becomes dysphoric. They initiate renewed pleasurable
contact. This opioid principle can be described as a biological
underpinning of Freud’s pleasure principle.
Patients maintained on opioids feel and think autistically.
Human contact is not needed. Their relatedness is flattened. They
are emotionally unresponsive. This condition might give pause
to a therapist who considers engaging an opioid-maintained
patient using a treatment where relatedness is at the center of
study by the analyst/analysand. For patients who dysfunctionally
do little but sit on the couch and take opioid pills, a role
responsive countertransference might be to feel disengaged,
bored, and unable to contribute. Without the concept that
opioids cause emotional withdrawal, the psychoanalyst might be
misled by their lack of emotional response, with a mismatch of
interpretation to the actual condition of the patient.
The concept that opioid function is contributor to relatedness
has more clinical applicability. An opposite shift of opioidergic
function would also have to be considered in any treatment of
a patient with fibromyalgia. These patients may be emotionally
unresponsive due to an autoimmune hormonal disorder that
diminishes opioid tone (Ramanathan et al., 2012; Johnson
et al., 2014). An approach which has promise is correcting the
opioidergic deficit by pulsing the brain with a low dose of
the receptor blocker naltrexone, which may provoke a rebound
augmentation of function (Brown and Panksepp, 2009). Fixing
the biological problemmight enable the psychoanalyst to address
emotional issues.
It is possible that this approach would also improve outcomes
in newly detoxified patients with opioid addiction (Johnson
and Faraone, 2013). Psychotherapy with interpretation used
to increase human contact might also be hypothesized to
augment opioidergic tone, and protect newly sober patients from
persistent low opioid tone that would otherwise lead to renewed
use/addiction.
A neurobiologically informed psychodynamic
psychotherapist might be able to better apply transference-
based techniques with patients who show compromised object
relations such as borderline states by taking into account a
probable chronic low opioid tone which is a product of early
childhood attachment patterns (Figure 1, Johnson and Faraone,
2013). Coincidentally, these techniques might include a face-
to-face format to enhance human contact/opioid tone in the
transference (Figure 1, Marty, 1990) and to control regression in
a closer therapeutic environment (Balint, 1968). The therapist
can use body language to understand the patient’s feelings more
efficiently. One might observe that pain diminishes when the
patient feels close/understood empathically.
Finally, what is physical pain, what is emotional pain? How
are they related? By asking this question, and by not being
able to give a full (saturated) explanation, a psychoanalyst is
both in a position to help their individual patient think about a
dysfunctional response to pain, and also to help pose questions
to be investigated by neuroscience. Differentiating physical and
emotional pain is complicated for fMRI research as well as
psychoanalysis (Hashmi et al., 2013). A neuropsychoanalytic
approach that takes both sources of information into account
may be indispensable.
DRIVE, INSTINCT, AND AFFECT
A set of motivational systems is housed in the brain so that
animals move through the environment to procure food, water,
sex, and relationships (Johnson, 2008). Freud’s concept of libido
encompassed cathexis, activity, and self-preservation (Freud,
1933, pp. 95–97). Some neuroscientists (for example Pfaff et al.,
2007) have proposed that Freud’s libido can be related to
generalized brain arousal systems. However, many contemporary
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FIGURE 1 | Relationship of pleasure and opioid tone in the central nervous system subcortical pathways.
psychoanalytic theories reject the concept of drive (Eagle, 2011, p.
252). Neuropsychoanalysis has embraced Panksepp’s formulation
of seven basic instinctual systems and has used his proposal to
discuss the concepts of instinct, drive, and affect.
Panksepp mapped these behavioral systems by systematically
stimulating brain areas electrically or chemically, and then
observing the resulting animal behaviors (Panksepp and Biven,
2012, p. 25). He has turned the usual caution of animal
researchers against “anthropomorphism” on its head, suggesting
that all animals have evolved neural systems for survival and for
success in navigating peer social environments, and that they are
felt. He is known for the discovery, by empathically observing rat
behavior and then by use of a transducer for high-pitched sounds,
of rat laughter (Panksepp, 2007).
The seven basic emotion systems that Panksepp has described
are shared by all mammalian brains. Emotional systems are
subcortical. They are the SEEKING, LUST, CARE, PLAY, PANIC,
RAGE, and FEAR systems. Panksepp uses capital letters to
identify a concrete neural circuit, as opposed to the abstract use
of these same words.
The SEEKING system is superordinate, and has been
considered by some neuropsychoanalysts (for example Yu,
2001b) an analog of Freud’s libido. Drive may be considered
the psychological manifestation of SEEKING, an urge to do
work in order to obtain a desired goal. Panksepp’s aphorism is
that SEEKING is “a goad without a goal.” SEEKING energizes
organisms to explore their environment. It produces for the
animal an exciting, optimistic and engaging affect. It reaches out
to the other six basic systems to turn them on when needed or the
other way around; other instinctual systems tell SEEKING what
to search for (Panksepp and Biven, 2012); giving the goad a goal.
SEEKING can search for basic items to satisfy needs in
the environment, such as food, water, sex, relationships, and if
addicted, drugs (Johnson, 2008). Some of these items may not
involve pleasure because SEEKING as all other basic emotion
systems learns and is conditioned by life experiences. If one grows
up in a context of basic trust (Erikson, 1950) from empathic and
caring parents, relationships may be sought in adulthood with
a SEEKING system that has been tuned by learning to look for
affective quality in relationships with others. But if parents were
abusive or neglecting, food, love, and an occasional unexpected
smack may make the bond with that parent more intense.
Pathological relationships may be sought because the SEEKING
system has been organized by learning to look for unexpected
attacks related to the lack of basic trust. We urgently pursue our
goals whether pleasant or not. The SEEKING system should not
be equated with a reward or pleasure system. SEEKING is not the
only rewarding feeling in the nervous system and it is not quite
rewarding in itself; its activation results in anticipated excitement.
If no satisfaction comes, it shuts down. The feeling is related to
frustration.
SEEKING’s main neurotransmitter is dopamine. Pleasure is
a separate system, with mu opioids as the most important
contributor (Robinson and Berridge, 1993; Panksepp, 1998).
What we want, and what we like, belong to two different brain
systems. The pleasure system will only be activated when an
object that satisfies a need is found. SEEKING looks for the object
needed. The pleasure system enjoys the interaction with the
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satisfying object. Dopamine drives motivation while mu opioids
give the feeling of pleasure.
Other instinctual systems are activated according to setting.
Animals move to the side of the cage where electrical stimulation
turns on these good feelings (Panksepp and Biven, 2012). They
move away when the bad feelings are turned on. We all feel
“good” when we are in the PLAY, CARE, LUST mode. We all feel
“bad” when we are in the FEAR, RAGE, PANIC mode.
PLAY, CARE, and LUST are positive, socially engaging
systems and are thus important to understand two-person
psychology or even the analytic third concept proposed by Ogden
(1994). PLAY is built into all mammals so that we rehearse
social roles and conflicts without risking consequences. PLAY
for children requires a rough and tumble interaction format that
elicits an affect of social joy. Wright and Panksepp (2012) advises
that psychotherapy be carried out in the PLAY mode. Observing
patients who are not capable of PLAY in psychotherapy gives
important information regarding (psychoanalytically) genetic
experience and current interpersonal difficulties. Good and fun
experiences with peers are pleasurable and will be repeated
reinforcing the experience of being in company as an important
agenda to promote survival. LUST is the system that makes
mammals look for sexual partners, not only looking for pleasure,
but also for the survival of the species. CARE is a system activated
whenever someone perceives another being in need of help. It
is the basis of maternal love and it may have a lot to do with
the psychotherapeutic feeling involved in helping patients at
certain stages of psychoanalytic treatments, particularly with pre-
Oedipal patients (Balint, 1968; Marty, 1990). The CARE system is
vital to the understanding of the relationships between mothers
and their offspring so relevant to psychoanalytic developmental
theory. The activation of a mother’s CARE system makes her full
with love that will contribute to her protecting a fragile baby that
could not survive without her CARE.
FEAR, RAGE, and PANIC/GRIEF have as their basic function
tissue protection. As opposed to the pleasant feelings generated
by SEEKING, PLAY, CARE, and LUST, these systems generate
dysphoric affect. FEAR is the feeling we all get when exposed
to dangerous situations that compromise survival. It is not
interpersonal. It provides the animal with various choices when
endangered. RAGE exists to deter attackers when flight is
impossible. Panksepp points out that the “fight/flight” term
describes engagement of RAGE or FEAR (Panksepp and Biven,
2012, p. 200), and actually refers to two systems, not one.
PANIC/GRIEF underlies the need to attach to others for
survival. It is the perfect complement of the CARE system as seen
in mother-child interactions. Activation of the PANIC system is
seen when animals separated from their parents call out with
“distress vocalizations” to help the protective locate the child.
If an animal is separated from its caring object for too long
the PANIC separation distress vocalizations cease. Watt and
Panksepp (2009) suggest that the original function of vocalization
shutdown was to protect animals from signals that might make
them vulnerable to attack from predators. Unrelieved alarm at
separation finally terminates by entering a shutdown mode, a
state of waiting to be found can be understood as a freezing
reaction, or—depression. This model corresponds with the
literature on psychotherapy and antidepressant medications for
depression. Mild major depression responds about equally well
to psychotherapy or medication, but more severe and chronic
depression requires antidepressants (de Matt et al., 2007). As
Watt and Panksepp would say (Watt and Panksepp, 2009),
antidepressants change the brain, allowing the patient to return
to the broad plateau of anxiety where interpersonal difficulties
in being close can be resolved with the psychoanalyst. Panksepp
(Wright and Panksepp, 2012) has suggested that treatment must
activate the SEEKING and PLAY systems as well as deactivate the
PANIC/GRIEF system to treat depression.
An example of dysregulation of the basic emotion systems can
be seen in the adoption of psychotoxic drug use. The person
feels constantly bad even when the traumatic experiences that
caused the negative affects are diminished or blocked by defenses.
The person tires of the unpleasant feeling and wants relief.
Experimenting with psychotoxic drugs the person discovers
the direct neurochemical impact on her or his subjectivity.
The patient has become a “psychiatrist” herself or himself,
understanding that there is a neuropsychodynamic relationship
between mind and brain. Taking the psychotoxic drug creates
a “high.” For example, a patient who had been terrorized
by a sadistic father, and who met the diagnostic criteria for
posttraumatic stress disorder, described the “high” of alcoholic
drinking as the feeling of relief from constant reactivation of her
terror by random stimuli in her environment.
The basic emotion systems constitute knowledge about
subjective states that are always conscious because affect is
always conscious. Taking it into account in psychoanalytic theory
propitiates metapsychological conceptualizations such as the
conscious id proposed by Solms and Panksepp (2012) and
Solms (2013). It also facilitates clinical work, particularly with
pre-Oedipal patients who do not respond well to the classical
psychoanalytic technique, but who require modified approaches
mainly based on empathy (Balint, 1968).
If we want something, or feel a certain way, the primary feeling
comes from brainstem areas. Consciousness is obliterated by
brainstem lesions, and preserved in cortical lesions (Solms, 2013).
Solms proposed that Freud’s id, the origin of drive, is represented
in the brain by consciousness that cannot be without affective
experience—the primary feelings being related to Panksepp’s
instinctual systems with secondary and tertiary elaboration into
more complex emotional experiences such as love, hate, disgust,
appreciation, gratitude, etc. For Solms and Panksepp (2012) if
affect is always conscious, then the id is conscious. The ego, first
a body ego, starts with exteroceptive experiences that register
cortically. Thinking can be repressed, but emotions cannot.
The psychoanalyst treating a patient may notice that they are
taken over by feelings most certainly provoked in part by their
experience, but not be consciously aware of why they may feel
bored, angry, sexual, afraid, or depressed. The lack of conscious
connection is a function of inhibition, probably cortical/ego
inhibition.
Object representations are cortical. They stabilize and
facilitate experiences in the world. Knowing that a certain person
always acts the same makes contact less effortful than on first
meeting them. Solms (2013) suggested that working memory
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underlies object representations and that planning ahead is
required to inform subsequent encounters so that the interaction
occurs with optimal relatedness. This mechanism underlies
Freud’s concept of bound energy. If life is always completely
predictable, one is living in Freud’s Nirvana principle. Thinking
is non-conscious and not effortful. One always expects what one
reality provides.
Free energy has to do with SEEKING as it presses for activity.
One is unhappy and unfulfilled when one needs something,
even though it may not be clear exactly what that might be.
This is the energy that reaches quiescence with gratification.
The SEEKING system knows what to look for only when given
feedback from other basic emotional systems. What we SEEK
does not always lead to optimal results. There may be learning
experiences that lead to solutions that make us approach harmful
stimuli such as the cases in which a narcissistic injury can
contribute to pathological object relations in adulthood. More
sophisticated tertiary process thinking/conscious awareness and
reflection about what we feel and think, possibly facilitated by
analysis of a transference relationship, may allow shifts in goals
and behaviors. The inhibitory centers of the prefrontal cortex are
related to ego and superego functions. Consciousness seems to
enhance survival because we can reflect and think about the very
fact of being alive (Solms, 2013).
DREAMS
Psychoanalysis was officially born in 1900 with Freud’s dream
theory. The mind was primarily unconscious. Dreams became
the royal road to the unconscious. Thus, dreams had to be
interpreted. This theory was predominant until psychoanalysis
suffered a cultural credibility defeat with the publication of the
activation-synthesis model by (Hobson and McCarley, 1977).
They claimed, with neuroscience evidence, that dreams were the
meaningless froth of random pontine firing during rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep (Solms, 1997). REM sleep was eliminated
by transection of cat brains at the level of the pons. Dream
interpretation was therefore the awakened person’s best attempt
to put some meaning to a pontine message that never had any
meaning. The cultural narrative became that psychoanalysts were
collecting fees from patients for fraudulently abetting this bizarre,
empty meaning-finding activity.
Cats whose brains have been transected at the pons lose
their rapid eye movements. But they cannot tell about their
dreams. The claim that dreaming depends on REM sleep and that
dreams are meaningless pontine signals has been singlehandedly
reversed by Solms’ painstaking work with 361 subjects who
were asked if they noticed a change in their dreaming since
the onset of a known neurological illness (Solms, 1997, p. 83).
His analysis of the results of this case series led him to a
hypothesis that the dream pathway originates in the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain, runs through the nucleus
accumbens (NA) via basal forebrain white matter tracts and then
through the mesocortical and mesolimbic dopaminergic systems.
Hobson and McCarley’s results could then be understood as
pontine-geniculate-occipital spikes of acetylcholine-fueled neural
activity further energizing the basal dopaminergic thinking
involved in non-REM (nREM) dreaming when these cholinergic
transmissions were turned on as part of the transition from
nREM to REM sleep. Solms concluded that VTA/NA activation
stimulating more rostral structures produces dreams. According
to interviews of patients with lesions, dreaming ceases when basal
forebrain white matter and/or the temporo-parietal-occipital
junction are damaged as opposed to pontine lesions, which do
not cause dream cessation. Dreaming is dissociated from REM
sleep. It can occur during NREM and does not depend on pontine
mechanisms.
A further consilience is that Solms’ dreaming pathway is
exactly Panksepp’s SEEKING pathway. Dreaming and SEEKING
involving the same neural pathway is congruent with Freud’s
(1900) hypothesis that every dream originates with a wish
(Solms, 2000), a motivation. Therefore, dreams are turned
on by items that are urgently wanted. Complications of
obtaining these entities are further manipulated via dreamwork
to anticipate conflicts and barriers in the social environment
of the dreamer. Freud’s work with dreams, and that of every
psychoanalyst since, has been vindicated by the work of
Solms.
This work has been further developed by Yu (2001a,b),
whose independent analysis confirmed both the neural pathways
involved in dreaming and suggested (Yu, 2001b) the congruence
of Freud’s (1923) “great reservoir of libido” and Panksepp’s
SEEKING system. In another vindication of Freud’s work, Colace
(2012) has shown a change in the dreams of children at about 5
years of age, corresponding with the onset of superego function.
Dreams of younger children are simple and directly anticipatory
of gratification. Dreams after the age of five have a tortured,
complex nature, as if there are internal barriers to gratification. A
main point of Colace’s (2012) is that with a thorough command
of Freud’s disguise-censorship model, nomothetic studies that
he has conducted provide strong evidence that internal conflict
between wish and moral consciousness appear in dreams.
Levin (Levin et al., 2009) has also considered the
neuroscientific data of importance to dream work, adding
that the involvement of the SEEKING system also refers to
pending topics in the life of the dreamer. Levin considers the
motivation of SEEKING to play an important role in problem
resolution. This is another contribution to the wish fulfillment of
dreams, namely that of exercising possible answers or strategies
for current problems in a person’s life.
Finally, Solms (2000) suggested that the same neural system
that involves dreaming also involves drug seeking. This idea
was further developed by Johnson (2001, 2003) and Colace
(2004, 2014) (Colace et al., 2010) as the neural basis of drug
dreams. Johnson (2003, 2011) hypothesized that dreams formed
a neural readout of brain changes that represent a shift from
a psychological form of addiction as a solution to emotional
problems to the brain-based illness of compulsive drug use. Only
patients whose brains have been exposed to cocaine or heroin
have dreams that involve looking for and trying to use these
drugs. Dreams that involve SEEKING alcohol probably signal
the transition from alcohol abuse (psychological addiction) to
alcohol dependence (physical addiction; Johnson, 2011).
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CATHEXIS
Although Panksepp (1999, pp. 28–29) and Yovell (2008) are
reluctant to claim any 1:1 mapping of Panksepp’s instinctual
systems onto Freud’s libido, Johnson (2008) has found another
consilience by using the SEEKING system to explain the Freudian
concept of cathexis. This psychoanalytic concept is on the
endangered theory list. The assertion that humans are object-
seeking by nature, and that this has nothing to do with “drive,”
has been widely adopted as a bedrock of psychoanalysis (Eagle,
2011, p. 54). Panksepp’s elaboration of instinctual systems that
are activated by SEEKING helps resolve this dilemma within
psychoanalysis. The PANIC, RAGE, CARE, LUST, and PLAY
systems are object-related. Mammalian brains are pre-wired to
bond to a care-giver for survival. CARE and LUST are the
basis of love (Panksepp and Biven, 2012, p. 38). PLAY demands
involvement with peers for social joy. These neural systems
give a goal to the goad of the objectless SEEKING system,
telling it what it is looking for. PANIC warns organisms not to
avoid relationships by giving a dysphoric signal when closeness
is disrupted. RAGE provides an array of possible responses
to uncomfortable impingements from others. SEEKING does
not act randomly but is given information by other basic
emotion systems to know what to seek for. CARE, LUST,
and PLAY systems need the SEEKING to successfully cathect
objects.
Johnson (2008) described cathexis as the consequence
of repeated stimulation of the SEEKING system during
early development. Animal research studies demonstrate that
inhibition of dopamine, mu opioid receptors, and hormones such
as oxytocin and prolactin, each inhibit the formation of partner
preference or maternal-infant bonding. Knocking out any one
of these systems results in behaviors that do not persist, such
as mating without the formation of partner preference. Bonding
is produced by dopaminergic drive coupled by hormones to
interactional experiences—in prairie voles and rats (Insel, 2003).
These concepts can be extended to humans.
Johnson paired neurobiological information with Freud’s
(1920) paper, “Beyond the pleasure principle,” to give further
evidence for Freud’s hypothesis that drive is necessary to form
attachments. Using the neuropsychoanalytic principle of dual
aspect monism the paper demonstrated that animal research
is congruent with Freud’s concept of a conflict between the
pleasure principle and a force that is, “More primitive, more
elementary, more instinctual than the pleasure principle which it
overrides” (Freud, 1920, p. 23). If one is SEEKING relationships
based on difficult experiences developed in childhood that do
not function adaptively in one’s adult life, repeated unpleasant
experiences result. The cathexis system had been tuned by drive-
related learning to look for those affective needs that were not
satisfied in the past. Unsatisfied affective needs survive despite
age. The very process of development is compromised frequently
resulting in pre-Oedipal pathologies. Traumatic emotions do
not expire and so they will try to cathect current objects. In
these cases a drive/pleasure conflict can be made conscious
with psychoanalytic treatment, resulting in more adaptive
relationships.
Johnson was careful to state that the existence of drive in no
way negates the current focus on how urgently humans want
to make relationships. It gives a neural basis for this urgency.
By using the clear difference between neural systems that are
involved in wanting and liking (Robinson and Berridge, 1993,
2000; Panksepp, 1998), the psychoanalyst can use of neuroscience
to extend our definition of “neurotic.” Patients with a series of
complaints about how their lives are not working out may be
trapped by conflicts between these neural systems. They may
be urgently pursuing goals with their SEEKING system that do
not line up well with pleasure. What they want is not what they
like, resulting in neurotic misery. The person adopts inflexible
patterns to try to adapt, which ignore the signals that affective
consciousness constantly provides.
According to Watt and Panksepp (2009) depression is the
result of a dysregulation mainly of the opioid PANIC system,
which in turn leads to the shutdown of the SEEKING system.
This combination of high PANIC and low SEEKING seems to
lead to a hopeless feeling. The resulting exhaustion can lead to the
wish to die in severely depressed patients, the product of endlessly
SEEKING relationships which are unpleasant and destructive. A
critical period is present in the evolution of the SEEKING system
in early life. If relationships have been affectively confusing or
traumatic, such dysregulation is repeatedly sought, leading to
essential (Marty, 1990), or anaclitic depressions (Bergeret, 1974,
1975).
Making a relationship with patrons through activation of
the cathexis system during drug sales, and thereby fulfilling a
drive that was created by the neural changes induced by the
drug, entrepreneurs of the addictive drug industry make close
relationships with customers who often die from using their
product. The compulsive use of addictive drugs is based on
cathexis to the seller of the drug as well as to the drug itself
(Johnson, 2008, 2009, 2013). The compulsive use of drugs is based
on a dysregulation of the SEEKING system that recruits cues
to build conditioned stimuli and responses. Affective misery is
shut off by drugs that quiet experiences of PANIC, FEAR, and
RAGE. This way of thinking about compulsive behaviors with
drugs or food gives the psychoanalyst a skill set that is essential
to help patients who suffer from behaviors that kill. Alcohol
causes 4% of deaths worldwide (World Health Organization,
2010). Cigarettes kill about four million persons per year (World
Health Organization, 2008). Love, cathexis, and death are linked
in this way. Death from cigarettes is not due to a direct
wish to die, otherwise smokers would simply kill themselves
in a faster way. Smoking is the result of complicated and
differentiated motives (Wurmser, 1974). Nicotine dysregulates
several neural systems, including SEEKING—which constantly
demands nicotine. Addiction is one of the illnesses that require
understanding both subjective experience and drug-induced
brain changes.
DYNAMIC UNCONSCIOUS
Non-dynamic psychology has provided a way of explaining
that thought is either implicit/procedural or explicit/conscious
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(Rosenblatt, 2004). For example, the first day you drove to your
new job, you explicitly thought about each turn. Everything you
did was conscious.
By now your car procedurally drives itself to work while you
listen to the radio or talk to a passenger. If you run into new
construction you shift to explicit thinking so that you still get
to work. You turn off the radio or stop talking to your friend,
and pay attention to the way around the construction. This
process does not involve repression or dissociation. No defenses
are employed. There is nothing “dynamic” about procedural
unconscious behaviors such as driving one’s car. Your behavior is
descriptively but not dynamically unconscious. Neuroscience has
referred to procedural, automatic behaviors as non-conscious.
They economize the processes of the nervous system once
learned.
On the other hand, you may “forget” to attend a meeting
that you really didn’t want to go to, but consciously would
have made yourself go to if it weren’t for the handy defense
of repression. You “remember” the meeting as soon as it is
too late to go. Then you feel bad. The difference between
thinking that is not conscious but not made unconscious
(descriptively unconscious) and material that is barred from
conscious thought (dynamically unconscious) is seen in these
examples. Current psychoanalytic thinkers favor concepts such
as “unformulated experience,” “implicit relational knowing,” and
“habitual relationship patterns” (Eagle, 2011, pp. 107–131), while
the old Freudian formulation of a stimulus barrier that protects
the ego from unacceptable information is going the way of drives,
dreams, and cathexes.
As with dream theory, Solms, with Kaplan-Solms, had the
original insights about using neurologically impaired patients
(Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000) to demonstrate striking
evidence for the psychoanalytic concept of mechanisms
of defense. One example is the anosognosia of right
hemisphere lesion patients. Non-analytic neuropsychologists
and neurologists invoked concrete concepts based on their
guesses about right hemisphere function. Maybe the problem
had to do with inattention, perhaps with the right hemisphere
being responsible for conceptualizing negative emotions, or for
monitoring the body (Solms and Turnbull, 2002, pp. 263–264).
The neurologist can benefit from a psychoanalytic explanation
to understand why the patient denies that their whole left
side is paralyzed. Psychoanalysts can see the evidence of the
unconscious laid out before them in a way that is stark and
well-delineated. Taking out a key right parietal part of the brain
does not make the person unable to function emotionally. It
eliminates the right parietal sense of location. Kaplan-Solms
and Solms’ (2000, pp. 172–199) formulation regarding conscious
indifference about the paralyzed left side was explained using
Freud’s (1917) concepts from “Mourning and Melancholia.” In
a left parietal stroke, position sense is preserved. The body is an
object. The patient mourns the loss of movement of the right side
of the body. Object love allows normal grief.
In a right parietal stroke, the patient is unable to understand
where the paralyzed left side lies. Some right parietal stroke
patients deny their paralysis and act as though nothing were
wrong with them. Kaplan-Solms and Solms interpreted this
feature as a narcissistic defense by which the patients deny a
painful aspect of reality. Unconsciously they know about their
paralysis, but their body location is impaired. An idealized
“good body” is introjected, protecting the stroke patient from
the horror of their loss. Unfortunately, a “bad body” is also
introjected, and is hated. The hatred can be experienced toward
the self, resulting in a melancholic depression, or projected into
others, resulting in an experience of being loathed by others.
These regressive dynamics are initiated by the loss of the sense
of location, of reality, that had been produced by the loss
of location sense that was a function of the destroyed right
parietal cortex. In neurologically impaired patients, evidence of
dynamically unconscious thinking, and the defenses that keep
material unconscious, can be easier to observe and describe using
the clinico-anatomical method.
Another example of the dynamic unconscious functioning
can be found in Bazan’s (2011) innovative formulation of
“phantoms.” Whether you get to work with explicit or implicit
thinking, there is no discomfort as long as you get there.
The brain has two feedback systems to monitor movements.
It makes a calculation from the somatosensory cortex about
where the car was estimated to go. The proprioceptive system—
vision and muscle receptors—says the car has gone where
the brain willed it, the “efference copy.” The two sensory
systems line up. You feel good when you get where you are
going.
Skipping the meeting when you had “intended” to go, results
in discomfort based on a lack of congruence between intention
and behavior. A “phantom” intention has no feedback from
proprioceptive system that you were at the meeting. Defenses
undo intentions by making them unconscious and therefore
unable to be acted on. The residua produce a feeling of
discomfort.
Bazan linked this set of ideas with word representations
that are seen as vulnerable to repression and substitution. She
suggested that the starting point of unconscious thinking is drive.
The drive comes into conflict with the social milieu of the person.
The drive itself cannot be repressed, only the corresponding
motor execution. For linguistic intentions, the phantoms are
phonemic. She uses the compulsions of the Rat Man (Freud,
1909) to show displaced action based on word representations,
shifting from an intention to marry (in German, “heiraten”) his
beloved to various substituted rats: Frau Hofrat—the governess
he had sexual play with as a child, fear of rats, the German term
“Raten” which refers to payments to bemade.Words or ideas that
are repressed cause the phantoms to be undischarged, creating
anxiety.
A constant underlying dynamic of compulsion is undoing of
unconscious intentions. This was Dodes’ (1996) explanation of
addiction as a kind of compulsion where the aggressive intention
to harm another is displaced into an addictive behavior rather
than a compulsive undoing of the intention. The sober person
who does not have good recovery (a dry drunk) is filled with
anxiety about aggressive urges which have not been carried out.
The minute the person decides to drink (Dodes, 2002, p. 4)
they feel better. Bazan might say that they know their aggressive
urges will be fulfilled. They know the aggressive phantoms will
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be carried out via displacement; the aggressive act is not done
consciously, but rather is expressed as an addictive behavior.
These phantoms are based on a melancholic state (Freud,
1917) in which past narcissistic injuries related to the primary
object lead to a RAGE activation where the introjected object
needs to be destroyed due to its negative split valence quality.
The compulsive behavior is related to the memory of pain
because of how the object failed to give narcissistic nurture at a
critical time in early life. This formulation reframes and further
explains Dodes’ (1996) assertion that addictive behaviors are both
directed toward current objects and are also driven by childhood
memories of traumatic helplessness.
IS THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
LIKE THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE?
Harrison’s Textbook of Medicine (Kasper et al., 2005, p. 1)
began with a chapter, “What is expected of the physician.” Their
assertion was, “The accelerating pace of changes in medicine
stems from an explosion of scientific information and the need
to blend this information into the art and practice of medicine.”
Psychoanalysis originated in neuroscience precisely attempting
to understand complex symptoms such as the ones observed
in hysteria and that traditional medical approaches had failed
to treat. Freud used all his neurological background to develop
the psychoanalytic proposal to focus on what medicine had not
considered: the mind. The mind was not seen as an isolated
entity, but was related to the body and the nervous system.
Metapsychology is based on neuroscience and is thus the original
basis of clinical psychoanalytic practice. Current knowledge from
neuroscience can offer new perspectives from which clinical
phenomena in psychoanalytic practice can be better understood.
Neuropsychoanalysis is a twenty-first century development
that has at its core the concept of dual aspect monism
(Solms and Turnbull, 2002). Whether phenomena are evaluated
empathically, or through measurements and statistics, it
introduces an artifact of perception. Empirical data is filtered
through the means by which it is made. Therefore, we are
in the delightful position of being able to make observations
by psychoanalytic clinical means that can also, perhaps with
some technical difficulties, be made with genetic testing, animal
observation of homologous behaviors, fMRI scanning, or some
other nomothetic approach. The same event can be observed
in stereo. Each approach informs the other. As Turnbull et al.
(2004) put it, “Neuropsychoanalysis (carries) a useful balance
between two quite distinct approaches: a clinically based tradition
that has a long history of generating provocative ideas, and an
experimentally based tradition that can test these ideas in a more
rigorous fashion.”
The discussions above reflect this approach. Nothing is lost
from psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis can only benefit from an
open dialogue with its old basic science, neuroscience, but
through a twenty-first century trip back to its origins. More
psychoanalytic insights and new theories are likely to appear
when psychoanalysts make observations tuned by neuroscience
information, such as Bazan’s concept that anxiety is driven by
repressed, urges, “phantoms,” or the concept that physical pain
and human relationships may be modulated by the same system.
The brain is the organ of affects and subjectivity. It is the organ of
the mind.
Psychoanalysis is a theory but also a technique in practice
that then benefits directly from information coming from other
fields, particularly neuroscience, the study of the nervous system
which increasingly includes subjective aspects. Neuroscience
was and can again become the basic science of psychoanalysis.
Famous cases such as Phineas Gage and HM have shown
the impact of a mind-brain relationship. Psychosomatics has
also given a connection between stress and body reactions
involved in various diseases because of autonomic dysregulation
(Alexander, 1950; Marty, 1990). Neurochemical manipulations
by psychiatrists or addicted persons have demonstrated an
impact on subjective feelings. Studies have shown modifications
that psychotherapies have on the brain (Buchheim et al., 2012,
2013; Bastos et al., 2013; Abbass et al., 2014; Fournier and
Price, 2014). It may be necessary to learn about the mind-
brain relationship if one practices any sort of psychoanalytic
treatment.
Fotopoulou et al. (2012) explained that,
“Neuroscience...shares an important goal with Freudian
metapsychology, namely to generate an accurate, large-scale
model of themind...” She described psychodynamic neuroscience
as:
1. forming and testing hypotheses that derive from a wider
theory of the mind, and re-integrating findings within the
same theory;
2. forming and testing hypotheses that have been informed by
years of clinical practice, and thus indirectly taking subjectivity
into account;
3. ascribing to mental processes an ontological status that is as
real as that of neural processes, and hence capable of causally
influencing the latter;
4. firmly acknowledging the epistemological limitations of the
discipline as a third-person, neuroscientific endeavor.
“I anticipate this focus will allow greater progress in
understanding the neurobiological basis of the mind, as
well as avoiding the extreme materialism and reductionism of
some other neuroscientific approaches.”
Challenges to neuropsychoanalysis from outside of
psychoanalysis have to do with reestablishing the value that
psychoanalysis used to have for science. Psychoanalysis has gone
from the dominant paradigm in psychiatry in the 1960s to a
marginalized field. Multiple investigators report that applications
for research funding are dismissed as coming from a discredited
source. Solms and Turnbull (2002, p. 299) wrote, “Both of us
have been in professional situations—more often than we like
to remember—where our interest in psychoanalysis has made it
difficult to maintain the respect of our colleagues, the esteem of
our students, and the willingness of journal editors to publish
our work.”
Neuroscience papers use behaviorist language to explain
behavior that specifically leaves out the brain. For example,
Volkow and Baler (2014) describe the “reward system” of the
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brain rather than discussing drives or SEEKING. As explained
by Panksepp (1998, p. 12) behaviorist psychology regarded
the brain as a black box. The “science” of psychology was
to impinge on animals and count resulting behaviors. This
behaviorist approach to neuroscience, using concepts that have
nothing to do with the brain, impoverishes. Animal behavior is
deeply comprehended when one understands that animal actions
are led by their affects. Human beings are no exception to
the fact that animals are profoundly emotional. Emotions are
based in neural circuits that provide our subjective states of the
mind. Neuropsychoanalysis offers an approach to brain-based
psychological concepts that can enrich both neuroscience and
psychoanalytic understanding.
In Govrin’s (2006) critique of postmodern relational
psychoanalysis he avers that one of the most important
contributions of positivist psychoanalysis is the ability to build
“thick” descriptions of phenomena. To build up the material
basis of psychoanalysis keeps it from drifting into idealism
(Johnson, 2006). Kandel (1999) in his famous paper about
uniting biology and psychology spoke of psychoanalysis as being
biology’s best psychological partner. His criticism highlighted
topics that need thorough reconceptualization and discussion to
help psychoanalysis to be even better, rather than be somehow
destroyed or discarded by a neuroscience perspective. If
psychoanalysis can dialogue its concepts and findings with other
fields of knowledge, then it is mature enough to keep making
progress toward a better understanding of the mind. Dual aspect
monism allows a complexity of conceptualization that is missing
from postmodernist cautions about inability to know what is
really true (Govrin, 2006).
CONCLUSION
Neuropsychoanalysis continues Freud’s original endeavor of
“psychology for neurologists.” It offers a way forward that
preserves and extends the empathic insights of psychoanalysts by
affording a second way to “know.” It allows the building of more
complex concepts without eschewing the postmodern skepticism
of relational psychoanalysis. In fact, skepticism is directly built
into the scientific method.
The ideographic ideas of psychoanalysis have nothing to fear
from the nomothetic procedures of neuroscience. An example
given above was Hobson and McCarley’s claim that dreams were
nothing but random pontine signals. They tried to discredit
psychoanalysts as if psychoanalysts had been collecting fees and
spending time explaining neural noise that had no meaning.
Sophisticated neuropsychoanalytic work by Solms and others has
put psychoanalytic dreamwork on solid ground. As Solms (2013)
stated, “Neuroscience is no more the final court of appeal for
psychoanalysis than psychoanalysis is for neuroscience. The final
court of appeal for psychoanalysis is the clinical situation.”
We anticipate that some psychoanalytic ideas will need
revision and reconsideration when considered against the
underlying neural systems involved in creating our psychology.
This ability only gives psychoanalysis more credibility for the
theories that have clear neuroscience evidence such as drive,
including a drive to be related, the structural model, the value
of dreams, cathexis, and the validity of the concept of the
dynamic unconscious. Neuroscience is naturally the basic science
of psychoanalysis. In the twenty-first century these two fields
can only benefit from working together again after years of
dissociation. An integrative perspective can create dialogues
leading to better conceptualizations and techniques to be applied
in the clinical situation. The human mind longs for a better
understanding about itself. Neuropsychoanalysis is the way. The
precept that neuroscience is the basic science of psychoanalysis is
of value to the field.
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